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So I can dream of a day, perhaps nearer than I think, when childless
parents will take a child for their own without caring what the color of
the skin may be. On that day prejudice will really be ended and the
ultimate reach of love achieved.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The video film footage is searing - a crying, screaming three-year-old
African-American 2 child, Christopher, is forcibly removed from the only
family he has ever known, the Caucasian couple who have been his foster
parents since he was five weeks old.3 The subsequent news coverage focused
intense public scrutiny on the issue of transracial adoption 4 in Texas.5
1. PEARL S. BUCK, CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION 91 (1964).
2. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1332-33 n.2 (1988)
(discussing interchangeable use of terms "African-American" and "Black" with upper-case
"B" to denote specific cultural-minority group, similar to "Asian" and "Latino"). This Comment will adhere to the "African-American" term.
3. KMOL News (San Antonio NBC affiliate television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1992); see also
Lisa Mascaro, RacialBias Cited in FierceBattle over Foster Baby, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Oct.
15, 1992, at AI (discussing Jenkins case). This story detailed the efforts of Phillip and Lana
Jenkins, a Caucasian family from Abilene, Texas, to adopt their African-American foster
child, Christopher, in spite of the opposition of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, which wanted to remove Christopher and place him in an African-American
home. Id. at A 12. The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services's physical
removal of Christopher from the Jenkins home was depicted in the KMOL Newscast of October 12, 1992. KMOL NEWS (San Antonio NBC affiliate television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1992).
The Jenkins case was decided in favor of the Caucasian foster parents, granting them the right
to adopt Christopher. In re Christopher Dewayne Harden, Nos. 1067-CX and 2828-CX (Dist.
Ct. of Taylor County, 326th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Feb. 26, 1993); see also RITA J. SIMON &
HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 6-9 (1987) (concerning

attempt at transracial adoption). The authors recount the experiences in 1985 of a childless
Caucasian couple in Maryland, both special-education teachers, who attempted to adopt their
African-American retarded foster child who had been in their care since birth. Id. at 6. The
parallels to the Jenkins case include the state agency's insistence on finding an African-American adoptive family for the child; the attendant media uproar, both locally and nationally; the
agency's subsequent reevaluation of its policies; and an African-American state senator's introduction of legislation to prohibit the blocking of adoptions on the basis of race. Id. at 7-8.
4. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1174-75 (1991) (noting that "transracial
adoption" generally used in context of placement of African-American child with Caucasian
parents). In this Comment, the term is used generally to refer to the placement of a child in
the home of parents of a different race or ethnic heritage.
5. See Lisa Mascaro, Racial Bias Cited in Fierce Battle over FosterBaby, SAN ANTONIO
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Although the Texas Family Code is silent on this issue,6 the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (formerly Texas Department of
Human Services), the agency charged with regulating adoption, has administrative policies stipulating same-race placement as a primary guideline for
foster care and adoption.7 However, in response to the media and public

LIGHT, Oct. 15, 1992, at Al (noting that Jenkins case placed state adoption policies, which
consider race and ethnicity, into public spotlight); Mike Tolson, Foster Parents Call for
Change, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Nov. 13, 1992, at Dl (detailing parents' attempts to adopt

crossracially and noting state removal of Christopher from Jenkins family); Ethnicity Should
Not Be Key in Matching Child with Couple, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, May 24, 1992, at DI (commenting through editorial on transracial adoption); see also Suzanne McAuliffe, Anglo Couple
Battle to Adopt HispanicGirl, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, May 19, 1992, at AI (detailing efforts of
Caucasian couple to adopt Hispanic baby). This adoption dispute was known as "the Baby
Annie case," and was also widely reported in the media. Cheryl and Nathan Peacock sought
to adopt their Hispanic foster child, Annie. Id. The state adoption agency contested this
adoption both on racial grounds and to keep Annie with her siblings. Id. at 5; Dan Trotta,
Anglo Couple Get Baby Annie "With God's Help", SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Dec. 1, 1992, at Al,
A8 (noting Baby Annie case heard in district court in San Antonio, with adoption to be finalized in December, 1992). Adoption records are sealed at the conclusion of the proceedings and
are, therefore, not available for review. See generally Usha Lee McFarling, Adoption Agency
Ripped: Foster Parents, Senators Urge Overhaul of System, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Aug. 19,
1992, at Cl (describing Texas Senate hearing on issue of transracial adoption); David McLemore, Adoption Case May Be Pivotal,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 6, 1992, at 39A (quoting
state officials who express intentions to review agency policies on transracial adoption).
6. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 16.01-02 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992). The Texas Family Code
states: "Who May be Adopted[:] Any child residing in this state at the time a petition requesting adoption is filed may be adopted ....
Qualifications of Petitioner[:] any adult may
petition to adopt a child who may be adopted." Id.
7. TEXAS DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES HANDBOOK § 6925
(1990) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal). The "Management Policy for Selecting an Adoptive Home" states the following:
The workers and supervisors must consider the following issues when selecting a home.
1. The child's need for placement with his siblings. DHS prefers to place siblings as a
family group. ...
2. Preservation of the child's racial and ethnic identity and heritage. DHS prefers to
place children with adoptive parents whose race or ethnicity is the same as the
child's.
Note: When the selection of an adoptive home does not conform to either of the two
considerations listed above, the worker must document the reasons for the exception and
the supervisor must approve and sign the worker's documentation.
Id.; see Adoption Bill Eyes Race, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Dec. 18, 1992, at E8 (discussing state
proposed adoption guidelines removing race as criterion); see also Mike Tolson, FosterParents
Callfor Change, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Nov. 13, 1992 at Dl (detailing several families' difficulties in adopting children of different race because of opposition from Texas Department of
Human Services). The article quotes a child-placement worker who complains that children
remain in state custody for long periods of time instead of being placed in adoptive homes of
different ethnicity. Id.
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concerns, the department has undertaken a review of its policies, 8 and a state

8. TEXAS DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE HANDBOOK § 6925
(Draft Revision 1993) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal). The revision is as follows:
The primary consideration in selecting an adoptive home for a child is the child's best
interest. In pursuit of the child's best interest, TDPRS tries to base each placement on an
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the child's needs and on the adoptive family's understanding of and potential for meeting
these needs....
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The workers and supervisors who select a home for a child must consider the issues listed
below. However, consideration of these issues should not delay the selection of a home.
Note: The order in which these issues are listed is not intended to suggest their relative
importance. The weight given to each of them varies from placement to placement
according to the child's specific short-term and long-term needs. In every placement,
the importance of a given issue depends on the individual child's particular needs.
Issues to Consider
1. The appropriateness of continuing the foster parents' relationship with the child
through adoption; when the foster parents have made a request to adopt the child
2.

1- The child's need for placement with his siblings.
Placing a child with his siblings DII .la e
t
sibling
... as a family g
preserves family identity and reduces separation trauma. When it is not possible to
place siblings together, or when staff determine that a sibling placement is not in the
best interests of the individual children, workers must try to place the siblings with
adoptive parents who are committed to helping them stay in touch C0otact with one
another.
3. 2. Preservation of the child's racial and ethnic identity and heritage.
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same as te cild's. Placing a child with adoptive parents whose race or ethnicity is
the same as the child's helps the child develop a sense of identity consistent with his
racial or ethnic background. The department will, however, consider placing a child
with adoptive parents of a different race or ethnicity ifstaff determine that the adoptive parents are able to
* help the child
" develop a sense of identity consistent with the child's racial and ethnic background, and
" learn to cope with difficulties that may arise from racial or ethnic differences,
both within and outside the adoptive family; and
" develop a plan for helping the child manage the issues described above as the child
reaches developmental milestones.
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-3 The child's known or predicted needs for special services after the adoptive placement, including therapy or special medical care.
4. The prospective adoptive family's ability and willingness to adapt its discipline practices to the child's needs.
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representative has introduced a bill for consideration in the 1993 legislative
session, which would9 forbid the use of race as a primary consideration in
adoption placements.
As revealed by this current controversy, a wide divergence of opinion exists in the legal and social-work communities regarding the appropriateness
of "race matching" 10 in foster care and adoption." Historically, both pub-

6.
7
8.
9.
11.

5. The personalities, temperaments, and lifestyles of the child and of the
adoptive family.
(r The family's ability to accept and develop the child's intellectual and
scholastic capabilities.
7. The family's ability to accept and provide for the child's religious beliefs
and practices.
&l.The family's plan for protecting the child's health if, for religious reasons,
the family does not believe in medical care.
+- The family's commitment to ensuring that the child has a permanent
placement.

Id.
9. Tex. H.B. 196, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993). State Rep. Karyne Jones Conley, who is African-American and represents District 120, introduced the following bill into the 1993 Legislative Session:
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Subchapter A, Chapter 16, Family Code, is amended by adding Section
16.081 to read as follows:
Sec. 16.081. RACE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A PRIMARY FACTOR. In
determining the best interests of the child under Section 16.08 of this code, the court may
not consider the race of the child or the prospective adoptive parents as a primary factor.
SECTION 2. Subchapter B, Chapter 41, Human Resources Code, is amended by adding Section 41.028 to read as follows:
Sec. 41.028. RACE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A PRIMARY FACTOR. The
department may not consider the race of a child or a prospectivefoster family as a primary
factor in placing the child in foster care.
SECTION 3. Chapter 47, Human Resources Code, is amended by adding Subchapter
C to read as follows:
SUBCHAPTER C. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN
Sec. 47.041. RACE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A PRIMARY FACTOR.
The department, a county child-care or welfare unit, or a licensed adoption agency may
not consider the race of a child or prospective-adoptive parents as a primary factor in
placing the child for adoption.
Id.
10. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1176 (1991) (defining race matching as placing "children who were physically and mentally as close a match as possible to the biological
children they [the parents] might have produced"). See generally id. at 1176 n.15 (noting
Child Welfare League of America's Standards for Adoption Services 1958 guideline, which
provides that selection of home should not be based on physical resemblances, except for racial
characteristics such as color); Patricia W. Ballard, Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption
Dilemma: Alternatives for the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 333-34 (1979) (arguing that
race matching may result in "undesirable" children, such as African-American or older children, remaining in foster or institutional care).
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lic- and private-placement agencies have widely employed the practice,
whether sanctioned by existing laws or not.12 The practice of race matching
raises a serious concern about the constitutionality of state administrative
procedures, which base their decisions on the race or ethnicity of the parties
involved. Such state actions should be determined to be violative of the
equal protection, due process, and liberty rights of the adoptive parents and
the adoptee, rights which are guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amend14
13
ment of the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution.
This Comment will trace the history of transracial adoption and outline

11. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (denying adoption in which race consideration played part), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(analyzing race as criteria in adoption), aff'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); In re R.M.G. &
E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 791 (D.C. App. 1982) (setting up three-prong test to determine if race
consideration is in best interests of child). See generally James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the
Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487 (1988) (arguing that transracial adoption is
detrimental, for most part, for African-Americans); Susan J. Grossman, A Child ofa Different
Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 327-35
(1968) (presenting early perspective on question of transracial adoption); Twila L. Perry, Race
and Child Placement.- The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 12627 (1990) (arguing that race should be factor only in initial placement of children in foster care
or adoption, but not in other custody contexts).
12. See Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 529-30 (1984) (criticizing social workers for vacillating positions on transracial adoption); Patricia W. Ballard, Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption
Dilemma: Alternativesfor the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 354 (1979) (noting that while
race matching is controversial, it is nonetheless part of procedural process of most agencies).
See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991) (discussing current race-matching
policies).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Id. See generally Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color. Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 335-45 (1968) (discussing implications of
statutes and social-agency practices regarding transracial adoption on due process and equal
protection aspects of federal Constitution); D. Michael Reilly, Constitutional Law. Race as a
Factor in InterracialAdoption, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022, 1024-37 (1983) (discussing constitutionality of several court decisions on transracial adoption).
14. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3. The Texas Constitution provides: "All free men, when they
form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive
separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Id.; see also
Biggs v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, no
writ) (affirming Texas constitutional mandate that all persons are to be judged in court by
same legal standards, regardless of race or color).
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the current controversies over the practice of race matching and its inclusion
as a factor in the existing standard of child placement known as "the best
interests test." This Comment will then analyze judicial treatment and statutory provisions that have been enacted in other jurisdictions to deal with
transracial adoption; question the constitutionality of race matching; and explore proposed alternate solutions. Finally, in discussing the currently proposed legislation, this Comment will recognize the need for the Texas
Legislature to take action to prohibit race matching in order to comply, with
the state's existing mandate to act in the best interests of the child.
II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

History of Adoption

Adoption is "one of the oldest and most widely employed legal fictions." 5
It was mentioned as early as 2000 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi, it occurred during Biblical times, and it was widely practiced by the ancient Romans.1 6 However, because of the feudal emphasis on bloodlines to transfer
inheritance, England did not recognize adoption until 1926.17 This absence
of English common-law precedent hampered the development of adoption in
the United States.'" Nevertheless, Texas, along with Louisiana, recognized
15. Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743,
743 (1956).
16. See In re Thorne's Estate, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (N.Y. 1898) (commenting on practice of
adoption of "strangers to the blood" in ancient Sparta, Athens, Rome and Germany); Leo
Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744-45
(1956) (noting early practitioners of adoption). See generally Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law ofAdoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 445-48 (1971) (detailing
adoption practices of ancient Romans); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv.
1038, 1041 (1979) (noting widespread practices of adoption ranging from ancient Europe,
through tribal Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Oceania).
17. See John Francis Brosnan, The Law ofAdoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 335 (1922)
(presenting pre-1926 perspective on complete lack of adoption in England and stating that
parents cannot abdicate parental responsibilities by contract); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 746 (1956) (referring to England's
Adoption of Children Act of 1926); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 448 (1971) (tracing early English law and
noting "inordinately high regard for blood lineage" of English); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 17961851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038, 1045 (1979) (commenting on inability of English common law
to incorporate adoption). The English common law was unable to accommodate a system of
adoption, because of its complicating effects on the English system of land title, which passed
solely through descent, and its violation of the rules of inheritance. Furthermore, adoption
interfered with parental authority, which was viewed as an absolute, God-given right. Id.
18. See In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Minn. App. 1991) (stating that adoption en-
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the practice of adoption before the rest of the country because of the early
influence of the civil law of Spain and France."9 The earliest adoption statutes in the United States were enacted in the mid-nineteenth century.20
Although the ancient and civil-law practice of adoption was born of the desire for continuity of the family, 2' adoption in the United States arose largely

tirely statutory and not known at common law); In re Thorne's Estate, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (N.Y.
1898) (emphasizing adoption as "form of domestic relation" was unknown at English common
law); Belden v. Armstrong, 113 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ohio 1951) (noting adoption exists by statute
only, not at common law). See generally Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color:
Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 306-09 (1967)
(tracing statutory development of adoption in United States); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 743 (1956) (commenting on lack of
adoption law in England); Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law
of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 456-61 (1971) (noting early American substitutes for adoption,
such as "putting out" children from one home to another, indentured servitude, and
apprenticeship).
19. See Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516, 520-21 (1863) (reporting early Texas case dealing with
adoption under Spanish law); see also Vidal v. Commagere, 13 La. Ann. 516, 517 (1858) (accepting term "adoption" in context of meaning at Roman and Spanish law); In re Thorne's
Estate, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (N.Y. 1898) (discussing provisions of Roman adoption law, modified
by Justinian, which were conveyed to modem Europe, including France and Spain). See generally John Francis Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 336 (1922) (noting Roman law requirements in adoption, which were directly reflected in Texas and Louisiana
statutes); Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and
Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 306 (1968) (comparing development of adoption
law in Texas and Louisiana with remainder of United States).
20. See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042-45 (1979) (tracing passage of Massachusetts adoption statute of 1851). The Massachusetts statute was the
first modem adoption law. Id. at 1042. Its importance was twofold: first, it overruled all of
the fundamental English common-law principles and precedent; second, it shifted the traditional focus of adoption from benefitting the adopter to benefitting the adoptee. Id. at 104243. For the first time, the welfare of the adoptive child became paramount, and the qualifications of the prospective parents were subject to scrutiny. Id. See generally Susan J. Grossman,
A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factorin Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF.
L. REV. 303, 306 (1968) (commenting on early state laws); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 748 (1956) (citing early Mississippi
statute of 1846 and Massachusetts statute of 1851); Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 465-89 (1971) (giving detailed
analysis of early American adoption laws and rise of private-placement agencies).
21. See John Francis Brosnan, The Law ofAdoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332 (1922)
(stating that Roman adoption designed to avoid termination of family line as well as perpetuate family religious worship); Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American
Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 447 (1971) (noting that Roman adoption was meant to
benefit adopting parent, not child); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American
Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038,
1041- 42, n.6 (1979) (citing examples of adoptive practices, which fulfill purposes of perpetuating ancestral worship and providing descendants to those lacking heirs).
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from concern for the welfare of neglected and dependent children.2 2 This
interest in the welfare of the child manifested itself in the evolution of the
"best interests" 23 standard, a "uniquely American contribution to the law of
24

adoption.",

B.

The Best Interests Standard
The best interests standard has been widely used as the appropriate test in

22. See In re Thorne's Estate, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (N.Y. 1898) (referring to pre-statutory
adoptions in mid-nineteenth century New York administered by charitable organizations on
behalf of destitute and homeless children); Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of
the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 488 (1971) (summarizing mid-nineteenth
century rise of private-placement agencies whose efforts at child welfare led to inhome placements). As adoption became more commonplace, public pressure increased to regulate the
relations between children and parents and to assure benefits of heirship to the children. Id. at
488-89. These pressures led to the passage of general adoption statutes in the latter half of the
century. Id.; see also Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND.
L. REV. 743, 748-49 (1956) (stating that American adoption laws departed radically from
Roman precedent in concern for welfare of child); Susan L. Brooks, Note, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of Permanency Planningfor Children with Special
Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1137 (1991) (citing deinstitutionalization movement as impetus for increased child placements).
23. See Linda Henry Elrod (revised by Steven C. Windsor, 1992), Child Custody and
Visitation, in FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE 32-1, 32-16, 32-17 (Arnold H. Rutkin, ed. 1992)

(stating that best interests determination requires judicial assessment and prediction based on
facts and circumstances in each case). The trial judge must, based on his perceptions, decide
which custodial arrangement will best serve "the child's physical, psychological and emotional
needs." Id.; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, 16-18 (1985)
(noting that child's best interests is alternative that maximizes good for child and commenting
on difficulty in predicting consequences of choices and selecting criteria to be used in evaluating alternatives). See generally Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American
Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038,
1072-84 (1979) (tracing early development of best interests standards in 1840s and citing subsequent cases weighing custodial rights in light of children's interests); Edward L. Barker &
Cathryn L. Hamman, Note, The Best Interests of the Child in Custody Controversies Between
NaturalParents: Interpretationsand Trends, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 482, 483 (1979) (discussing
evolution of determining child custody from early common-law view of child as father's chattel
through emerging dominance of best interests doctrine).
24. Leo Albert Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743,
749 (1956); see also In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. App. 1977) (tracing best
interests standard from late-nineteenth century usage to modern applications); Chapsky v.
Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 655-57 (1881) (noting balancing of factors to decide custody of child
between father and aunt who raised child); Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925)
(holding that sole concern of court in custody dispute is interest of child, rather than mediating
parents' dispute). See generally Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests
Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 54-55 (1990) (noting application of best
interests standard in custody, adoption, and foster care proceedings); Richard A. Edwards,
Note, Adoption -

The Welfare and Best Interest of the Child, 5 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 93-

102 (1968) (enumerating factors to be considered in determining best interests of child).
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deciding child placement, both in custody and adoption proceedings.2 5 Generally, the best interests standard holds that the sole guideline in determining
placement of the child should be furtherance of the welfare of the child.26
This standard requires that placement agencies and courts consider various
factors, such as the age of the child, family resources, stability of the family,
blood relationships, and preference of the child.27 However, the best interests concept has been criticized by commentators as a generalized standard
that is too vague and subjective,2 8 and, therefore, subject to overly broad

25. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 16.08 (Vernon 1986) (setting forth best interests test). This
provision states: "If the court is satisfied that ... the adoption is in the best interest of the
child, the court shall make a decree granting the adoption." Id.; see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (noting state has duty to protect interests of children); In re D.I.S. for the
Adoption of S.A.O., 494 A.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. App. 1985) (stating that best interests of child
has been standard in custody cases for many years); Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y.
1925) (Justice Cardozo opining that chancellor in custody dispute acts as parenspatriae to do
what is in best interests of child); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of
the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE LAW & POL'Y REV. 267, 267-69 (1987) (discussing

current standard); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the
Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 54 (1990) (noting best-interest rule widely accepted).
26. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (stating that welfare of child controlling factor); State ex
rel. Portage County Welfare Dep't v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ohio 1974) (citing historic
preference for consideration of child's interests in adoption proceedings); Davis v. Collins, 147
Tex. 418, 425, 216 S.W.2d 807, 811 (1949) (affirming that welfare and rights of child paramount consideration in adoption); Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 252, 28 S.W 281, 282 (1894)
(stating that child's interests must be served above all others in adoption); HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 21.8, at 653 (2d. ed.

1988) (affirming that adoption, as well as custody, utilizes best interests standard in determining placement). But see Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests
Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 503 (1984) (stating that best-interest consideration
unacceptable as either rule or goal because consideration inhibits actual analysis of competing
values and evaluation of such values in placement considerations).
27. See Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d. 1051, 1054 (Alaska 1975) (listing such factors as
age, sex and health of child, emotional attachments of parties, moral fitness of parties); In re
Petition R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 781 (D.C. App. 1982) (listing factors to be considered in best interests analysis); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 21.8, at 653-54 (2d. ed. 1988) (listing factors that courts sometimes

find not dispositive in adoption, such as unmarried status and age of adoptive parent); David
L. Chambers, Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 487-99 (1984) (outlining
differing ways to consider best interests of child, including child's own perception).
28. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, 16-18 (1985)

(commenting on indeterminacy of best interests standard and pointing out many possible interpretations based on competing views and values of decisionmaker); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard,59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 527-45
(1984) (analyzing child-welfare agencies, minority groups, and children whose individual interests and values compete against one another under the banner of "best interests"); Twila L.
Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J.
FAM. L. 51, 58-59 (1990) (criticizing best interests standard as incapable of functioning as
guideline in custody cases).
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judicial interpretation. 29 This subjectivity has especially troubling implications for transracial adoption which, like all other placements, is governed
by the best interests standard. 0
C.

TransracialAdoption
1. Race Matching and the In re Minor Standard

Traditionally, race has been one of the relevant factors considered by the
courts in determining the best interests of the child. 3 1 Courts and legal com-

mentators have addressed extensively the issue of whether a racial match
between adoptee and adoptive parents should be one factor, or indeed the

overriding factor, of the best interests determination.

2

In one of the early

29. See B.G. v. San Bernardino County Welfare Dep't, 523 P.2d 244, 256-57 (Cal. 1974)
(opining that sole consideration of best interests would allow judge to remove child from biological parents without showing of detriment to child); In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d at 1323 (stating
that best interests test is flexible standard requiring judge to make rational decisions free of
bias, reversible only for abuse of discretion); In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977)
(stating that best interests standard by necessity is imprecise and elastic); Susan J. Grossman,
A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factorin Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF.
L. REV. 303, 309 (1968) (observing that courts freely interpret standards); Shari O'Brian, Race
in Adoption Proceedings: The PerniciousFactor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 486 (1986) (concluding
that courts granted wide latitude by statutes that allow race as factor bearing on best interests
determination).
30. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (stating that child's welfare was controlling factor in
racially disputed case); Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207 n.2 (Nev. 1976) (overturning lower
court decision and noting trial court's reliance on physical appearance of children in placing
them with African-American father); Raysor v. Gabbey, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294 (N.Y. 1977)
(stating that decision on custody for racially mixed child must focus on who can best furnish
guidance and confront future problems of race); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption:
Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 503-04 (1984) (noting
that transracial placement troubled by competing interests of child versus minority cultural
identity). See generally Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test
and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 56-57 (1990) (stating best interests rule does not
help resolve issues when racial differences present).
31. See In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 782 (D.C. 1982) (stating "the question of
race is important" in adoption); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. 1983) (concluding that
race should be factor considered in child-custody proceeding); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child
Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 81 (1990)
(stating that race often used as factor even if alternative to crossracial adoption is institutionalization). But see Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 208 (Nev. 1976) (holding that race consideration impermissible and violative of Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution);
Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d. 243, 246 (Pa. 1973) (holding that interracial marriage of mother was not valid reason to deny custody of children). See generally D.
Michael Reilly, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Race as a Factor in InterracialAdoption, 32 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1022, 1023-24 (1983) (presenting analysis of three-prong test developed by District
of Columbia Court of Appeals to determine whether race plays factor in adoption).
32. See In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 791 (proposing specific three-part analysis to determine relevancy of race when two families are vying for child). The court's three-step evalua-
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leading cases dealing with interracial adoption, In re Adoption of a Minor,aa
an African-American husband wished to adopt his Caucasian wife's child
who had been born out of wedlock.34 The trial court denied the adoption,
stating that the child "might lose the social status of a white man by reason
of the fact that by record his father will be a negro." 3' - The appellate court,
in overturning the lower court's decision, said that race may be relevant, but
that as a "factor alone [race could not] be decisive in determining the child's
welfare."' 3 6 Courts have since ostensibly followed this case's standard, "relevant but not decisive," when confronted with a custody or adoption proceeding involving race.37
2.

The Early View of Transracial Adoption

Historically, the states' statutory treatment of the issue of race in adoption
varied from outright prohibition to silence. 3' For many years, some states,
tion is: "(1) how each family's race is likely to affect the child's development of a sense of
identity, including racial identity; (2) how the families compare in this regard; and (3) how
significant the racial differences between the families are when all the factors relevant to adoption are considered together." Id.; see, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family &
Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (allowing race to play substantial part in
denying adoption), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Lucas, 299 A.2d at 245-46 (holding that
race may not be considered in custody battle); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children
Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1254-56 (1991)
(arguing that race should not be factor in adoption proceedings); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best InterestsStandard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 545-47
(1984) (suggesting that hierarchy of interests exists in determining relevance of race in adoption placement, including interests of child and relevant social goals). See generally Jay M.
Zitter, Race as Factorin Adoption Proceedings, Annotation, 34 A.L.R.4th 167 (1984) (summarizing cases which address race in adoption and categorizing them according to granting or
denying adoption).
33. 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 447.
36. Id. at 448.
37. See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (finding race
relevant but not determinative); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 624 (Pa. 1983) (noting that undue
emphasis should not be placed on race); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1967, no writ) (citing Minor standard in decision striking down statutory prohibition
against crossracial adoption). See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children
Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1239 (1991)
(finding that courts use race as significant and possibly determinative factor); D. Michael
Reilly, Note, ConstitutionalLaw. Race as a Factorin InterracialAdoption, 32 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1022, 1025 (1983) (stating that courts inconsistently interpret Minor standard due to
impreciseness).
38. See, eg., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (citing LA.
REV. STAT. tit. 9, § 422: "[a] single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married
couple jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race"); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d
656, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, no writ) (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. § 8, art. 46a:
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including Texas, prohibited cross-racial adoption by statute.3 9 In a seminal
1967 case, In re Gomez,4 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals struck down the
Texas statute forbidding such adoptions.4" The court declared the law in
violation of both the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.4 2 Five years later, the last outright prohibition on transracial adoption fell when a United States district court overturned a similar Louisiana statute,43 declaring that race could be a relevant,
but not determinative, factor in adoption.'
3.

The Continuing Debate Over the Role of Race in Adoption

Although governmentally sanctioned racial discrimination in the form of
a blanket prohibition of transracial adoption is now unconstitutional, an intense debate still rages regarding the proper role of race in child placement.
This battle has been, and continues to be, waged on a philosophical level in
both the legal and social work arenas. 45 As social conditions changed and

"[n]o Caucasian child can be adopted by a negro person, nor can a negro child be adopted by a
Caucasian person"). But see Hodges' Heirs v. Kell, 51 So. 77, 81-82 (La. 1910) (allowing
Caucasian father to adopt illegitimate biracial children because at time of birth no miscegenation statute was in place); Susan J. Grossman, A Child ofa Different Color: Race as a Factorin
Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 308 (1968) (noting 1962 South
Carolina statute not expressly prohibiting interracial adoption, but declaring misdemeanor for
Caucasian person to give over Caucasian child to care or custody of African-American person); Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of UnregulatedAdoptions, 59 YALE L.J.
715, 722 n.36 (1950) (listing various state statutes which in 1950 prohibited or somehow restricted transracial adoptions).
39. See Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 268 (overturning last remaining statutory prohibition on
transracial adoption); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d at 659 (overturning Texas statute that had
forbidden transracial adoption). See generally Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different
Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 306-14
(1968) (discussing adoption law in 1968, including states which outlawed transracial adoption); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of
Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 80-81 (1990) (discussing Compos decision).
40. 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, no writ).
41. Id. at 659.
42. Id. at 657-58. The court noted that the question of whether denial of adoption on the
basis of race was unconstitutional presented an issue of first impression for both state and
federal courts. Id.
43. See Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 268 (declaring that statute violated equal-protection
standard).
44. Id. at 266.
45. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (allowing race to play very substantial part in denying adoption
of African-American child by Caucasian adoptive parents), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978);
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (determining that race alone
could not be deciding factor in adoption placement); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. 1983)
(concluding that race should be factor considered in child-custody proceeding); RITA J. SIMON
& HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIEs 3 (1987) (noting
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legal barriers to segregation fell in the 1960s, the acceptance of transracial
adoption grew.46 In 1972, however, the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) took a militant stand against transracial adoption,
referring to it as "genocide,", 47 and subsequently, crossrace placements fell
39% in one year.4"

popular conception among many child-welfare professionals that transracial adoption is unnatural); cf. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 246-47 (noting standards
used in various types of custody cases have differing guidelines, and commenting that judicial,
legislative, and scholarly authorities increasingly demand uniform standard). Compare Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1254 (1991) (arguing against any official racially determined adoption-placement policy) with James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The
Nexus Between PutativeAfro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J.
FAM. L. 487, 533-44 (1988) (proposing act which makes race dispositive in adoption
placement).
46. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring state's anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (striking down
Florida statute forbidding African-American/Caucasian cohabitation as violative of constitutional freedom from official discrimination on basis of race); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding racially segregated schools unconstitutional). See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1178 (1991) (citing increase in transracial adoptions from 733 reported in 1968 to 2,574 reported in 1971); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis
of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 505-16 (1984) (finding seven
major factors which led to increase in transracial adoptions in 1950s and 1960s). These factors
are: (1) the increasing numbers of children, especially abused children, entering the placement
system; (2) deficiencies in the foster-care system, which kept many children in long-term foster
care; (3) clinical studies, which identified the detrimental effects of long-term institutionalization and maternal deprivation; (4) the dramatic decline in the number of healthy Caucasian
babies available for adoption, because of the increasing availability of contraception and abortion; (5) the social-work profession's declining emphasis on race matching in adoption; (6) the
insufficient number of minority homes wishing to adopt; (7) changing social attitudes towards
racial integration, which led to an increased acceptance of transracial adoption. Id.
47. See Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 517-18 (1984) (quoting National Association of Black Social
Workers (NABSW) Position Paper from April 1972). The NABSW paper stated:
[Wie have taken the position that Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster care or for adoption. Black children belong, physically, psychologically and culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total sense of
themselves and develop a sound projection of their future. Human beings are products of
their environment and develop their sense of values, attitudes and self concept within their
family structures. Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves as Black people.
We the participants of the workshop have committed ourselves to go back to our communities and work to end this particular form of genocide.
Id.
48. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss4/10

14

Eubanks: Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests Standard

1993]

COMMENT

1239

Similarly, the Standards for Adoption Services of the Child Welfare
League of America (CWLA) revealed the vacillating attitudes towards crossracial placement over the last thirty-five years. In 1958, the CWLA advocated race matching; in 1968, it reversed its position to encourage transracial
adoption; and in 1972, it retreated to its advocacy of race matching yet
again.4 9 A similar pattern of adoption placement for Native American children emerged, culminating in the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act,5" which
mandated a strong preference for placing Indian children in racially
matched homes." The NABSW and several commentators have proposed
passage of an act for
African-American children analogous to the Indian
52
Child Welfare Act.

Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1180 (1991) (citing falling numbers of African-American adoptions for years 1971 through 1973); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 517-18, 528
(1984) (discussing effect of NABSW position on transracial adoptions and attitudes of social

workers).
49. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics ofRace Matching
in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (1991); see also Margaret Howard, Transracial
Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 528 (1984)
(decrying social-work professionals' tendency to alter commitment to transracial adoption
based on political considerations, as exemplified by bowing to pressure from NABSW).
50. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1983).
51. Id. Section 1915, which deals with adoption of Native-American children, specifies
that preference should be given to the child's extended family, his tribe, or other Native-American families. Furthermore, preadoptive placement and foster care are limited to the above
three categories, or an institution for Native-American children. Id.; see also Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
503, 520-22 (1984) (detailing adoption of Native-American children in large numbers during
1960s and 1970s, which resulted in fears that tribal cultural identity would be lost); Richard B.
Taylor, Note, Curbing the Erosion of the Rights of the Native Americans: Was the Supreme
Court Successful in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield?, 29 J. FAM. L. 171, 187
(1990) (noting that Congress passed Indian Child Welfare Act because large number of Native-American children removed from tribes through adoption by non-tribal members). The
Act was intended to serve the best interests of the Native-American child as well as the tribe.
Id.
52. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1182 n.43 (1991) (noting that NABSW proposed National Black Heritage Child Welfare Act as amendment to Indian Child Welfare Act
to mandate same race placement for all minority children); James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the
Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487, 533-44 (1988) (detailing proposed draft of AfroAmerican Child Welfare Act of 1988); Marlon N. Yarbrough, Comment, Trans-RacialAdoption: The Genesis or Genocide of Minority CulturalExistence, 15 S.U. L. REV. 353, 360 (1988)
(arguing for passage of National Black Heritage Child Welfare Act, patterned on the Indian
Child Welfare Act). But see Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best
Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 530-33 (1984) (comparing group interests
of African-Americans and Native-Americans affected by transracial adoption). There are several distinguishing features that separate the Native-American and African-American posi-
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Statutory and Judicial Treatment of Race in Adoption Proceedings

In conjunction with the changing attitude toward transracial adoption in
the social-work establishment, state legislatures have moved to address the
issue. Several states have recently implemented statutes that require agen-

cies to follow "inrace ' 5 3 placement guidelines in adoption.54 Minnesota
passed a Minority Adoption Act in 1990, which mandated that courts follow

inrace-placement preferences for minorities and children of ethnic heri-

tage. 55 In 1991, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional because it imposed different criteria for racial minorities.5 6 The
Minnesota Legislature, following the recommendations of the court, 57 revised the statute in 1992 to eliminate any reference to the child's "minority"
status. 58 In contrast, other states have decreed that race should not be a

dispositive factor in adoption. 59 For example, Ohio instituted a detailed
tions on crossracial adoption's effect on cultural and ethnic identities. Id. One major

difference is that, whereas the numbers of Native-American children being transracially
adopted was large enough to pose a genuine threat of cultural extinction, the numbers of African-American children adopted has been and continues to be very small. Id. at 532. There
appears to be no genuine threat of assimilation of the African-American cultural, ethnic, and
racial group. Id. See generally RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 9 (1987) (noting "intransigent opposition of most major
black social work organizations to transracial adoption").

53. See

RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR

FAMILIES 4-6 (1987) (comparing number of inracial adoptions versus transracial adoptions,
and noting that most adoptions are family members). "Inrace" denotes placement of the child
in a home of the same racial or ethnic background. See id. (using term as opposite of
transracial).
54. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 222.35-222.36 (Deering Supp. 1993). The California
Code provides that "[w]henever a child is being considered for adoption, the following order of
placement preferences regarding racial background or ethnic identification shall be used... (a)
[i]n the home of a relative. (b) If a relative is not available ... with an adoptive family of the
same racial background." Id. § 222.35. Furthermore, the California statute places a ninety
day limit on the search for a suitable racially matched family. If no such family is located
within that time, then the child can be placed in a home "where there is evidence of sensitivity
to the child's race, ethnicity and culture." Id. § 222.35(c); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102
(Michie 1991) (dictating that consideration be given to child's race or minority heritage in
adoption placement). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63 (West Supp. 1993) (including no mention of race in adoption statute).
55. See In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. App. 1991) (citing original statute).
56. Id. at 415-16.
57. Id. at 413 (urging less-discriminatory alternative through use of racially neutral
wording).
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28 (West 1992). The statute reads in part, "[T]he policy of
the State of Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of children are met by requiring due
consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage in adoption placements." Id.
59. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63 (West 1981) (stating that court "shall not
disapprove any adoption solely because of ... a difference in race, color or religion . . ."); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (stating that petition for adoption
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transracial placement scheme which forbids denial of adoption on the basis
of race. 6' Unlike most other state laws, the Ohio regulations specifically
forbid a delay in placement if the agency cannot find an adoptive home of
the same race or heritage. 6 '
The decisions of the last two decades interpreting these various statutes
and early case law show that the courts, while ostensibly following the "relevant but not decisive" standard of In re Minor,6 2 may still allow race to be
an overriding determinative factor in adoption.63 In Drummond v. Fulton
County Department of Family & Children'sServices,' 4 the Fifth Circuit denied a Caucasian couple the right to adopt the racially mixed child for whom
they had served as foster parents for over two years. 65 The court granted the
state agency the right to remove the child, Timmy, from the foster home,
even though no other family was available to adopt him.6 6 The court agreed

cannot be denied on basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or interfaith background); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5.311 (Supp. 1992) (stating that agency cannot withhold consent for sole
reason of difference in race between adoptive parents and child); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.82(6)
(West 1992) (stating that no person may be denied as adoptive parent on basis of race, color,
ancestry, or national origin). However, Kentucky allows parents to annul an adoption within
five years if the child exhibits any different ethnic traits of which the parents were not aware.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.540(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
60. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:2-48-03 (1990).
61. Id.
62. 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
63. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (showing evidence that race played substantial part in denying
adoption), cert denied, 437 U.S. 901 (1978); In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 782 (D.C.
1982) (upholding statute that allowed race as consideration in adoption proceedings, as long as
not "automatic"); Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (finding lower court had alternative reasons to deny adoption other than race). But see In re Adoption of Baker, 185 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (overturning lower court decision,
which had denied adoption on issue of race). See generally Angela T. McCormick, Note,
TransracialAdoption: A Critical View of the Courts' PresentStandards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, 303
(1990) (questioning effectiveness of Minor rule); D. Michael Reilly, Note, ConstitutionalLaw.
Race as a Factorin InterracialAdoption, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022, 1025 (1983) (stating that
courts have applied Minor test in various ways).
64. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
65. Id. at 1203.
66. See id. at 1215-16 (dissenting opinion) (detailing agency's administrative decisionmaking process, which focused solely on race); Shari O'Brian, Race in Adoption Proceedings:
The PerniciousFactor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 489 n.18 (1986) (tracing subsequent unsuccessful
placement effort of child in Drummond). Of the nineteen agency staffpersons who jointly decided to remove the child Timmy from the Drummond home, only four had ever seen him or
the Drummonds. Id. at 488; see also Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement. The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 81 (1990) (noting only alternative
for child in Drummond was institutionalization). See generally Larry I. Palmer, Adoption: A
Plea for Realistic Constitutional Decisionmaking, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1-25
(1979) (presenting detailed analysis and harsh criticism of Drummond decision).
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that it was clear from the evidence that the agency had given "substantial
weight" to the race of the parties in the decision to deny the adoption, yet,
the ultimate decision unconvincingly concluded that "race was not used in
67
an automatic fashion.",
This decision overturned an earlier panel verdict ruling 68 that the Drummonds and Timmy possessed protectable interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment that could not be denied without affording them due process.69
The factual record and testimony of the original district court proceeding
reveal an unrelenting emphasis on the child's mixed-race heritage and the
Drummonds' race, 7° even while lauding the exceptional home the Drummonds had provided for Timmy. 7' The tragic outcome for Timmy was that
"[h]e was.., deprived of his status as a wanted child as a result of a generalized agency assumption about the long-term best interests of a minority
72

child."
In Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 7 the court denied adoption by a Caucasian

family of an African-American child who was a boarder in a group home.74
The court reasoned that the agency had not denied the adoption on racial

grounds because other factors, such as family size and the mother's working
outside the home, were ostensibly considered, despite evidence showing that
the agency's assistant director had aired her personal views regarding the
"problems that might arise from interracial adoption."' 75 And, in another
leading case involving competing adoption petitions of an African-American

67. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1204; see also Angela T. McCormick, Note, Transracial
Adoption: A Critical View of the Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, 310 (1990)
(stating that race was clearly used in Drummond to deny family right to adopt child they
loved).
68. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't. of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
69. Id. at 857.
70. See id. at 837-49 (repeatedly noting that Drummonds were Caucasian and that
Timmy was of mixed African-American descent). At one point, the court noted that "his
complexion is light olive. He has a definite Afro and is a physically appealing mixed race
child." Id. at 840.
71. See id. at 842 (commenting on home life of Timmy and Drummonds). The agency
report noted that "Timmy is an exceptionally well-adjusted child. There is no question that he
is the center of this household. He talks in sentences, counts to ten ....
[T]he fact that he is
bright, active, and friendly is a tribute to the excellent care he is receiving from these parents."
Id.
72. Shari O'Brian, Race in Adoption Proceedings.: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TUL. L.J.
485, 488 (1986).
73. 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
74. Id. at 316; see also Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement.: The Best Interests Test
and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990) (noting situation of Nickerson child in
institution).
75. Rockefeller, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
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child's grandparents and the Caucasian foster parents, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals analyzed in detail the statute, which allowed race
as a consideration in adoption.7 6 The court, applying a constitutional analysis of strict scrutiny, concluded that the best interests of the child are a compelling government interest.77 The court determined, however, that the trial
court had not specifically addressed the issue of whether the placement
agency had impermissibly used race as a factor.78 Therefore, the court remanded7 9 and provided a three-prong test to aid the trial court in analyzing
race as a relevant factor in an adoption dispute.8 °
III.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Race Matching and AntidiscriminationAnalysis

The patent use of race as a factor in determining adoption placement appears to be in direct conflict with federal and state laws prohibiting racial
discrimination.8 1 In practically no other realm is racial classification an acceptable basis for state action.8 2 Because the United States Supreme Court
76. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 783.
77. Id. at 788.
78. Id. at 792-93.
79. Id. at 791.
80. In re R.M.G. at 791, 794.
81. E.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3. Federal law provides a
remedy to private citizens for incursions against their constitutional rights by state authorities
acting under state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The law states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law....
Id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that denial of freedom to marry
based on racial classification violates Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (striking down
Florida statute forbidding interracial cohabitation as violative of constitutional freedom from
official discrimination on basis of race); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
(stating that distinction between citizens because of ancestry "odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"). See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 1.03 (3d. ed. 1991) (detailing history and
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The
Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1226 (1991) (stating that use
of race matching is discriminatory and in conflict with law).
82. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment
created to eliminate all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race); cf Larry I.
Palmer, Adoption: A Pleafor Realistic ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1979) (arguing for focus on child's constitutional right to have family rather
than on constitutional theory of race). See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954) (finding school segregation unconstitutional); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (stating racial preference for no reason other than race is discrimina-
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has mandated that racial classifications are inherently suspect and must be
subjected to strict scrutiny, only a finding of a compelling government interest should survive these challenges.8 3 Yet, to date, the courts have generally
failed to consider the use of race in adoption proceedings as an invidious
violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Several prospective adoptive
and foster parents have challenged race-matching policies on the constitutional grounds of equal protection, due process, and 4denial of a liberty inter8
est, but these parents have met with little success.
tion); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1229 (1991) (declaring that "the adoption world is an
anomaly in this legal universe in which race-conscious action is deemed highly suspect and
generally illegal").
83. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (analyzing use of racial classification); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (stating classification based on race
must be viewed in light of Fourteenth Amendment, which was created to eliminate race discrimination arising from state actions); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(declaring racial classifications subject to rigid scrutiny); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp.
25, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (concluding that race classifications are suspect and must achieve compelling state interest); In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 784-86 (D.C. 1982) (analyzing
requirement of strict scrutiny as relating to consideration of race in adoption and holding strict
scrutiny appropriate).

See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 1000 (1978) (stating that strict scrutiny must be applied to political actions that burden
fundamental rights or exhibit prejudice against racial minorities). Professor Tribe explains
that legislative and administrative actions that classify on the basis of race and benefit or burden the fundamental rights of different groups unequally must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1002. Such state actions may be unconstitutional, unless a compelling governmental
justification exists. Id.; see also Eileen M. Blackwood, Race as a Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1985) (discussing Supreme
Court's use of strict scrutiny as test for racial classification). See generally Lisa Jonas & Marshall Silverberg, Comment, Race, Custody and the Constitution: Palmore v. Sidoti, 27 How.
L.J. 1549, 1551-54 (1984) (discussing race as suspect classification).
84. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 836-37 (1977) (finding that foster families not deprived of constitutional rights by state
actions); DeWees, 779 F. Supp. at 28 (showing that Caucasian foster parents wishing to adopt
biracial child not unconstitutionally denied adoption on basis of race; rather, attitudes towards
race and coping with racial problems appropriate consideration in determining child's best
interests); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that foster
parents have protectable liberty interest under Pennsylvania Constitution), aff'd on other
grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1989); In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 778 (finding that adoption
statute, which allows race as factor, does not deny equal protection to prospective parents).
See generally Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost
of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 84-85 (1990) (arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied to
adoption and foster-care proceedings where race is issue); D. Michael Reilly, Constitutional
Law: Race as a Factorin InterracialAdoption, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022, 1030 (1983) (discussing court's rejection of adoptive parents' equal-protection claim in In re R.M.G.).
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Case Law: How Much Emphasis on Race Is Permissible?
1. McLaughlin v. Pernsley

In McLaughlin v. Pernsley,8 5 Caucasian foster parents challenged, as a
violation of their equal protection and due process rights, the city's removal
of their African-American foster child without notice, and subsequent placement of the child in an African-American foster home. 6 The parents alleged that such action was taken on the basis of their race. 7 The federal
district court concluded that the decision to remove the child was unconstitutional because it was based solely on race and, therefore, violated both the
child's and the foster parents' equal-protection rights.8 8 The court reasoned
that the racial classification used by the placement agency, in order to be
constitutional, must be justified by a compelling governmental interest that
serves a legitimate purpose.8 9 Acknowledging that the child's best interest
was such a compelling interest, the court concluded that the use of race as
the determining factor in foster-care placement was not a proper objective, 90
and that the evidence was substantial that race had been the only consideration in removing the child. 9 ' However, other courts have found that when
race is used as merely one factor in the placement determination, such a
facial classification will survive strict scrutiny because it is deemed necessary
to advance the compelling interest of fulfilling the best interests requirement
in child placement. 92
85. 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affid on other grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (8th Cir.

1989).
86. Id. at 319-20.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 324. The child, Raymond Bullard, had been removed from the McLaughlins'
(his Caucasian foster parents) home in 1985 and placed in an African-American foster home

where he resided during the ensuing three years. Id. at 321. Psychiatric testimony presented
during the trial found that Raymond had suffered from severe depression since being removed
from the McLaughlins. Id. at 327. Upon being reunited with the McLaughlins at a psychiatric-testing session, the psychiatrist noted that "it was as if someone had turned on a light
switch and a light had come on inside of him." Id. at 329.
89. McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp, at 324.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court obviously disbelieved the placement agency, which belatedly attempted
to disparage the McLaughlins' abilities as foster parents, in the face of the agency's own overwhelmingly favorable evaluations of the family. Id. at 321-23.
92. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that consideration of race is merely factor in finding child
best home), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); In re R.M.G. and E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 782
(D.C. 1982) (allowing race to be used as consideration in adoption as long as use not automatic). But see In re D.I.S. for Adoption of S.A.O., 494 A.2d 1316, 1327 (D.C. 1985) (stating
that strict scrutiny not required in interracial adoption case). See generally Elizabeth
Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1239 n.213 (1991) (listing cases that allowed race to be used as signifi-
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2. Palmore v. Sidoti
The Supreme Court took the unusual step of reviewing a Florida state
court child-custody decision in Palmore v. Sidoti9 3 because the Court found
that the case raised important constitutional concerns regarding race discrimination.9 4 In Palmore, a Caucasian father sought to obtain custody of
his daughter from the girl's biological mother, who had lived with, and sub-

sequently married, an African-American man.95 The Florida court had ordered a change in custody solely on the basis that the child might suffer
social stigma if she remained in the racially mixed home.96 The Supreme
Court affirmed that this racially motivated action was subject to strict scrutiny and must, therefore, achieve a compelling governmental interest to
avoid being unconstitutional.9 7 The Court then determined that "granting
custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial
governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause."9 " The
Court acknowledged that social pressures and private prejudices undoubtedly exist; it found, however, that such prejudices do not justify the use of
racial classifications in deciding child custody. 99 Nonetheless, it appears
that the Court did not decisively close the door on any consideration of race;
rather, it precluded a racial classification based solely on a presumption of
harm to the child."° It remains unclear whether the Court intended that a
showing of actual injury to a child would permit race to be a controlling
consideration in a custody dispute.' ° ' To date, the Palmore decision has

cant or determinative factor); Shari O'Brian, Race in Adoption Proceedings: The Pernicious
Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 490 (1986) (criticizing Drummond decision as example of court's
concealing use of race as overriding factor).
93. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
94. Id. at 431-32.
95. Id. at 430.
96. Id. at 431.
97. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33 (stating that lower court's decision based entirely on
race and explaining strict-scrutiny doctrine).
98. Id. at 433.
99. Id.
100. See id. (stating that possible injury to child because of prejudice cannot be consideration in decision to remove child from mother based on interracial marriage).
101. See J.H.H. & S.C.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
where child may be reunited with natural parent, race obviously must be considered as part of
best interests determination, thereby distinguishing Palmore); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d
897, 898 (Ky. 1987) (finding that child's severe emotional reaction to mother's biracial remarriage may be considered as part of best interests determination). See generally Charles P.
Wisdom, Jr., Will Palmore v. Sidoti Preclude the Use of Race as a Factorin Denying an Adoption?, 24 J. FAM. L. 497, 499-506, 520-21 (1985) (critiquing Palmore decision); Eileen M.
Blackwood, Note, Race as a Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 209, 226 (1985) (concluding that intent of Palmore decision unclear as to
whether it prohibits use of race in all custody decisions).
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been interpreted narrowly to apply only to parental custody
disputes and,
02
1
unknown.
is
circumstances
other
in
impact
its
therefore,
In spite of the narrow application of Palmorethus far, it is certainly possible to read the Court's decision more broadly to apply to the invidious use of
race to assess placement of children, whether in custody, adoption, or fostercare contexts.' 0 3 Indeed, the Court's willingness to address race as a factor
in a family dispute shows that it considers racial discrimination in this context to be of the highest priority. Because in Palmore the Court reaffirmed
that any state action that relies on a racial classification must be taken for a
compelling reason," a state preference for race matching that results in a
disproportionate number of minority children remaining in foster or institutional care indicates that the state has failed to fulfill rationally its goal of
protecting the welfare of the children.
IV.

A.

SOCIETAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Society's Children: The StatisticalImbalance

The legal and sociological theories regarding transracial adoption must be
analyzed in the context of the social realities of the adoption world and the
existing research on the effects of cross-racial placement. Although the
102. See J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 245 (distinguishing Palmore by finding that foster parents do
not have rights coequal to natural parent's right in custody dispute); Holt, 722 S.W.2d at 898
(finding Palmore controlling, and declaring that trial court erred in denying custody to Caucasian biological mother married to an African-American man on basis of race). The court did
not read the Palmoredecision to prohibit race as a consideration in determining the best interests of the child in foster placement. Id. See generally Eileen M. Blackwood, Note, Race as a
Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 226
(1985) (concluding that some racial considerations necessary and judicial flexibility serves children's best interests); Dixie Lynn Johnson, Note, Domestic Relations: Racial Factors in
Change of Custody Determinations: Palmore v. Sidoti, 15 N.M. L.J. 511, 518 (1985) (stating
that although facts and cases cited in decision indicate narrow construction, broader interpretations possible).
103. See Farmer v. Farmer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588-89 (N.Y. 1981) (surveying judicial
decisions in which race played part in custody and adoption proceedings, and contrasting
weight given to race in parental custody disputes compared to non-parental disputes). The
Farmer court concluded that race is only one of many factors to be considered in a custody
dispute between parents over a biracial child. Id. at 590. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet,
Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1163, 1244 n.233 (1991) (arguing that custody dispute in Palmore closely analogous to
adoption in that state attempting to structure family on basis of race); Eileen M. Blackwood,
Note, Race as a Factorin Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 209, 212 (1985) (comparing custody and adoption proceedings and noting similarities in
that both use best interests test to determine most beneficial home for child). Blackwood noted
also that nothing in the Palmore decision precludes application of the Palmore analysis to
adoption proceedings. Id. at 224.
104. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.
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United States government ceased collecting data on adoption in 1975,105 statistics for fiscal year 1988 indicated that nationwide approximately 46% of
children in foster care awaiting permanent homes were African-American. 106 In contrast, African-American children under age 19 constitute approximately 14% of the general population of children in the United
States. 10 7 Furthermore, studies indicate that the number of families waiting
to adopt are overwhelmingly Caucasian. 0 ' In May 1992 in Texas, there
105. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR
FAMILIES 4 (1987).

106.

SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,

No

PLACE TO CALL

HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1990). American Public Welfare Association statistics for 1988 indicated that approximately

49% of children in foster care were Caucasian, 39% were African-American, and 8% Hispanic. Lynee Duke, Couples Challenge Same-Race Adoption Policies, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
1992, at Al. However, of those placed during that year, 61% were Caucasian, 23% AfricanAmerican and 9% Hispanic. Id.; see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833-34 (1976) (recognizing that disproportionate number of children in foster care are minorities). See generally Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1332-33, n.3 (1988) (noting great disparities in socioeconomic positions of Cau-

casian and African-Americans). Approximately 44% of African-American children lived in
poverty in 1986. Id.; see also Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests
Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 51 n.1 (1990) (citing health study that
indicated in 1989 African-American children represented 55% of AIDS cases in children
under 13, and African-Americans accounted for 25% of all AIDS cases). There are large gaps
in income levels, unemployment, infant mortality, and life expectancy between African-American and Caucasian populations. Id.; see also RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 121-26 (1987) (detailing effects of abortion, birth
rates, and lifestyle choices on Caucasian and non-Caucasian populations with resulting dearth
of Caucasian infants and effect on transracial adoptions).
107. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL
HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 38

(1990). In 1986 in New York, 80% of the children in foster care were African-American or
Hispanic. Id.
108. See RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR
FAMILIES 8-9 (1987) (listing possible reasons advanced by African-American social-work professionals for discrepancy between numbers of Caucasian and non-Caucasian adoptive homes).
Among the reasons cited are the lack of effort by predominantly Caucasian social workers to
recruit African-American families, the use of Caucasian middle-class standards that precludes
many working-class African-American families, and historic suspicion among African-Americans of public agencies. Id.; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?
The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1186-87 (1991) (discussing disproportionate fit between Caucasian adoptive-parent pool and children awaiting adoption); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1984) (giving several reasons for insufficient number of
African-American adoptive homes). Professor Howard notes that often agencies have been
accused of not taking affirmative steps to recruit African-American adoptive families and that
higher economic criteria often keep African-American families out of the adoptive pool. Id. at
514.
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were almost 9,000 children in foster care, almost a third of whom were African-American. " Of the almost 700 Texas families waiting to adopt, nearly
two-thirds were Caucasian. "U This disparity between the number of minority children awaiting placement and the number of available homes makes
clear why a racially unbiased placement system is urgently needed: to assure
that each child is moved into a loving, permanent home as quickly as possible.' " One of the greatest criticisms leveled at the policy of race matching is
that it delays placement of minority children so that they languish in foster
care or in an 12institutional setting far longer than other children before find1
ing a home.

109. See Cindy Rugeley, Ethnic Adoptions Blessing or Curse? State Discourages TransracialPlacement, HOUSTON CHRON., May 31, 1992, at State 1 (quoting Texas Department of
Human Services statistics). Of the 8,814 children in foster care in Texas, 3,127 were Caucasian, 2,750 were African-American, 2,232 were Hispanic, and 705 were classified as "other."
Id.
110. Id. The statistical breakdown of the 694 families waiting to adopt was 476 Caucasian families, 132 African-American families, and 86 Hispanic families. Id.
111. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 836-37 (citing studies that show median time spent in foster
care in New York was four years and that the longer child is in foster care, the more likely she
will never leave it); SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO
CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1990) (recognizing that median length of stay for African-American child in foster care is
one third longer than Caucasian child). See generally Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas
Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L. Q. 343, 347 (1972) (advocating full legal status
and bill of rights for children). The authors list ten rights to which children should be entitled.
The first right is "[t]o receive parental love and affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow
to maturity in a home environment which enables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult[.]" Id.; Patricia W. Ballard, Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternatives for the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 355 (1979) (noting overwhelming
recognition of harm to child caused by delay in placement).
112. See SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL
HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1990) (noting that minority and impoverished children stay in foster care significantly longer,
and wait longer, than Caucasian children for permanent families). In 1985, there were more
than 16,000 children awaiting adoption: 71% were older than six months of age, 47% were
minority races, and 79% waited longer than six months. Id. at 54. See generally Elizabeth
Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1193-94 (1991) (describing policies that involve holding minority children in foster or institutional setting for "substantial periods of time" when no inrace adoption
possible); Marlon N. Yarbrough, Comment, Trans-RacialAdoption: The Genesis or Genocide
of Minority Cultural Existence, 15 S.U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1988) (arguing that delaying or
denying adoption placement to African-American child on basis of race is overt racism).
Although an indepth analysis of the relevant literature is beyond the scope of this Comment,
there is overwhelming support in the mental-health field for the view that continuity and finality of relationships are vital to the psychological wellbeing of children and that institutionalization or lengthy and successive foster placement extremely detrimental, often resulting in
permanent personality deficiencies. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children
Belong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1223-25 (1991)
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B. Empirical Studies of TransraciallyAdopted Children
What happens to a child after adoption into a racially different home has
been the subject of both conjecture13 and scientific analysis."1 4 The principle drawback to transracial adoption voiced by its opponents is the possibility of the child's loss of cultural and ethnic identity. I" 5 Several empirical
(noting vast body of research that indicates serious harm to children caused by delay in placement and concluding that current inrace-placement policies exacerbate this harm); Twila L.
Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J.
FAM. L. 51, 72 & nn.74-77, 73 & nn.80-82 (1990) (noting widely accepted concept of "psychological parenthood" and importance of bonding with primary caretaker, and citing studies on
psychological bonding); Patricia W. Ballard, Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternatives for the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 356 & n.114 (1979) (noting
harmful effects of institutionalization and listing psychiatric studies on parental deprivation).
Ballard noted also that the leading authority on children's emotional wellbeing emphasizes the
importance of stable relationships to children. Id. at 338. A "psychological parent" is defined
as "one who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of
Discretion, 29 J.FAM. L. 51, 72 n.76 (1990).
113. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977) (considering transracial adoption as "potentially tragic" because parents unable to cope with child's problems), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); In re
Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting lower court, which opined
that child would lose Caucasian status if adopted by African-American man); In re B Children, 391 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977) (overruling social agency decision to leave
African-American child with Caucasian foster mother by relying in part on hypothetical view
that such children "could develop dysfunctional coping mechanisms"); In re Davis, 465 A.2d
614, 623 (Pa. 1983) (stating that child raised in racially different environment may face hostility of adoptive parents' relatives). But see Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d
243, 245 (Pa. 1973) (noting increasing incidence of interracial marriage and transracial adoption, and stating that studies show children raised in such homes do not suffer).
114. See LUCILLE J.GROW & DEBORAH SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS
RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALT-

(1974) (reporting results of study on transracial adoption);

27-85 (1987) (presenting in-depth
study of attitudes of transracially adopted children and their parents); J. SHIREMAN, GROWING UP ADOPTED: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR ISSUES 24 (1988) (describing major studies
on transracial adoptees' adjustment and concluding the children seem to be as well adjusted
and integrated into their families as other adoptees), quoted in Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do
Black Children Belong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163,
1208 n.120 (1991); CHARLES H. ZASTROW, OUTCOME OF BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS (1977) (detailing results of study of parental satisfaction with
transracial adoption); James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus
Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J.FAM.
L. 487, 533-44 (1988) (presenting overview of legal, sociological, and psychological literature
regarding role of African-American family in maintaining African-American culture in relation to transracial adoption). See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children
Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1207-26 (1991)
(extensively reviewing existing research on psychosocial adjustment of transracial adoptees).
115. In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 792 (D.C. 1982) (evaluating effect of family's
STEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES
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studies, however, including a comprehensive examination spanning twelve
years of transracially adopted children and their families,1 16 indicate that
this fear is largely unfounded.117 The studies analyze factors such as educational achievement, self-esteem, behavioral problems, and levels of satisfaction expressed by members of the families.1 1 ' The studies found the
adoptees fully integrated into their families,' 19 with self-esteem comparable
to other children,' 20 and comfortable with their racial identity. 121
race on child's sense of racial and cultural identity and self-esteem); In re B Children, 391
N.Y.S.2d at 814 (stating that child's acceptance of African-American image crucial to adjustment in life); see In re Davis, 465 A.2d at 623 (opining that child raised in racially different
environment may face many problems such as lack of role models); James S. Bowen, Cultural
Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between PutativeAfro-American Family Values and
the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487, 510-11 (1988) (arguing that African-American homes provide African-American children with survival skills needed to cope in racist
society). But see Marlon N. Yarbrough, Comment, Trans-RacialAdoption: The Genesis or
Genocide of Minority Cultural Existence, 15 S.U. L. REV. 353, 359-60 (1988) (arguing that
African-American child placed in Caucasian home maintains ethnic pride and identity).
116. See RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE AND IDENTITY 12628 (1992) (summarizing results of longitudinal study of transracial adoptees and families from
1972 to 1984).
117. See id. at 124-41 (detailing tests of racial identity of transracially adopted children
and their siblings and finding adoptees accurately identified themselves racially and expressed
no Caucasian racial preferences); Rita J. Simon, An Assessment of RacialAwareness, Preference
and Self Identity Among White and Adopted Non-White Children, 22 Soc. PROBs. 43, 56
(1974) (reporting that African-American children reared in multi-racial families do not show
ambivalence toward their race, in contrast to other groups of African-American children); cf
CHARLES H. ZASTROW, OUTCOME OF BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS TRANSRACIAL

ADOPTIONS (1977) (concluding transracial adoption is successful and desirable way to care for
homeless African-American children). See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black

Children Belong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 12071226 (1991) (presenting detailed analysis of research studies on transracial adoption); id. at
1211-12 n.128 (listing fourteen major studies on transracial adoption).
118. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1211 (1991); see also CHARLES H. ZASTROW,
OUTCOME OF BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS (1977) (noting

that studies show parental satisfaction in transracial adoption as high as in intraracial adoption); Sandra Scarr & Richard A. Weinberg, I. Q. Performanceof Black Children Adopted by
White Families, 31 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 726, 726 (1976) (reporting study on I.Q. test scores of
transracially adopted African-American and biracial children). The research indicated that
the children scored above the I.Q. and mean school-achievement scores of the Caucasian population in general. Id.

119.

RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR

FAMILIES 69 (1987).
120. Id. at 79.
121. Id. at 27-28; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The
Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1217 (1991) (citing Chicago
Child Care Society study that found transracial adoptees developed strong sense of AfricanAmerican identity and pride); Rita J. Simon, An Assessment of Racial Awareness, Preference
and Self Identity Among White and Adopted Non- White Children, 22 Soc. PROBS. 43, 57
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THE INDETERMINATE STANDARD

Inconsistency in JudicialApplication of the Race Factor

There is general agreement that the welfare of the children should remain
as the paramount consideration. Nevertheless, suggested answers to the
question of whether race should be a factor in adoption placement are as
varied as the points of view detailed in this Comment. Basically, the cases
assume three positions. While the courts have not expressly supported the
extreme position of the NABSW that any transracial placement is detrimental to the child, some opinions ostensibly use "harm to the child" to mask
the fact that race was indeed the underlying and overriding concern.' 22
With rare exception, the opposing view that race should play absolutely no
part in the balancing of best interests factors has also not found currency
with the courts. 12 3 The majority of decisions nominally favor a middle

(1974) (noting that African-American children raised in Caucasian families perceive their ra-

cial identity as well as Caucasian children, and have positive attitudes toward African-American images).
122. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (removing African-American child from Caucasian foster
family who wished to adopt him, even though no other home was available to him), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Ethridge v. Ethridge, 360 So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)
(affirming lower court decision to remove children from custody of mother following her marriage to African-American man); In re D.I.S. for the Adoption of S.A.O, 494 A.2d 1316, 1327
(D.C. 1985) (upholding removal of mixed-race child from Caucasian foster parent in spite of
considerable testimony by social workers and mental-health professionals that child would be
best served by remaining in foster home). Among the circumstances noted by the appellate
court in Ethridge were that the father was in arrears for child support and had been convicted
of assault and battery on the wife, the children had expressed a preference for the mother and
her new husband, the new husband was a dentist earning $56,000 annually and had provided a
large home, while the biological father and his new wife resided in a trailer in rural Alabama.
Ethridge, 360 So. 2d at 1006-08. In spite of such evidence, the trial court found that it was in
the children's best interests to remove them from the custody of their mother, and the appellate court, in affirming, acknowledged that "perhaps" the decision would have been different
had the dentist been Caucasian. Id. at 1008. See generally Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a
Different Color: Race as a Factorin Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303,
344 (1968) (stating that courts have upheld race matching even if another outcome preferable);
Angela T. McCormick, Note, TransracialAdoption: A Critical View of the Courts' Present
Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, 315-16 (1990) (stating that courts hide decisions based on race
because "relevant but not decisive standard" too ambiguous).
123. See In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 120 (Pa. Super. 1982) (finding fundamental error in lower court's consideration of race of mother's boyfriend in deciding custody
of children). The Temos court stated, "[R]ace is not a 'consideration', or 'concern' or 'factor.'
Questions about race are in no respect 'appropriate.' In stating that race 'ought to be' a consideration, the lower court was fundamentally mistaken." Id. at 120; see also In re Bess P., 276
N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1966) (urging that agency policies and procedures be reviewed so that
equal placement services provided to all children regardless of race, color, and religion); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black ChildrenBelong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption,
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ground, which allows varying degrees of consideration of race as a factor., 24
The problem with this approach is an inconsistency in application that allows judicial bias to dictate the outcome, while ostensibly upholding the
principle of equal protection. 25 Unfortunately, the
result of adherence to
26
children.
the
to
harm
actual
been
has
policy
this

139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1256 (1991) (arguing that society should not use racial preferences
to determine best interests of child in adoption); Shari O'Brian, Race in Adoption Proceedings:
The PerniciousFactor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 498 (1986) (concluding that use of racial criteria in
adoption perpetuates racial separatism).
124. See, e.g., Dewees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that
placement agency did not unconstitutionally rely on race in placement, but that race may be
consideration in transracial adoptions); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (finding that use of race as sole criteria inadequate for placement); In re R.M.G. &
E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 786 (D.C. 1982) (concluding that race may be factor, but its use must
be precisely articulated). See generally Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 127 (1990) (concluding that race
should be major factor only in initial placement of children, but should be limited as factor in
removing children from foster parents wishing to adopt them); Patricia W. Ballard, Note,
RacialMatching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternativesfor the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L.
333, 373 (1979) (concluding that ideal policy is to follow Minor standard and apply as liberally
as community standards permit).
125. See In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting lower
court, which commented that child would lose Caucasian status if adopted by African-American man); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 623 (Pa. 1983) (denying adoption reasoning that child
might not be accepted by adoptive parents' relatives); cf McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 331
(stating that removing children from psychological parents because of differing races can never
promote the public interest). See generally Patricia W. Ballard, Comment, The Interracial
Adoption Implications of Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs.,
17 J. FAM. L. 117, 151 (1978) (citing judicial reluctance to consider interracial adoptions tends
to give agencies complete discretion in placements); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1240
(1991) (claiming that courts have tendency to ignore or distort role race plays in placement
agencies' decisions); Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rightsfor Children, 6
FAM. L. Q. 343, 350 (1972) (declaring that "legal fictions" should not mask fact that factors
other than child's best interests are determinative in placement decisions); Angela T. McCormick, Note, TransracialAdoption: A Critical View of the Courts' PresentStandards, 28 J. FAM.
L. 303, 315 (1990) (noting that present standard allows courts to disguise unconstitutional
decisions based on race).
126. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (removing African-American child from Caucasian foster
family who wished to adopt him, when no other home was available), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
910 (1978); McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 330 (citing severe depression in African-American
child removed from Caucasian foster home); Ethridge, 360 So. 2d at 1008 (removing children
from custody of mother because she married an African-American man); In re D.I.S. for the
Adoption of S.A.O, 494 A.2d at 1327 (upholding removal of mixed-race child from Caucasian
foster parent contrary to testimony by mental-health professionals that child would be best
served by remaining in foster home). See generally Shari O'Brian, Race in Adoption Proceedings: The PerniciousFactor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 492-93 (1986) (contrasting harms to minority
children from delays incurred in waiting for racial match, as compared to alternative of inter-
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Legal Commentary and Suggestions to Eliminate Inconsistency and
Bias

In addition to the courts and legislatures, legal commentators have grappled with the difficult question of how much of a factor race matching
should play in adoption and, consequently, have devised varying formulas.
Professor Bartholet, a frequently cited legal authority on transracial adoption, considers three options: (1) a significant preference for race matching;12 7 (2) a mild preference, which favors inrace placement only if all other
factors are equal; 12 and (3) no racial preference at all. I29 Professor
Bartholet's conclusion is that any preference for race matching is harmful to
the children. 3 0 Among the harms she details are delays in placement,
which prevent early development of crucial parent-child bonding; the breaking of close bonds formed with foster families while awaiting same-race
placements; and increased risk that older and disabled minority children will
never find permanent homes.' 3 ' In addition, Dr. Bartholet points to empirical studies showing that transracially adopted children are well-adapted and,
132
thus, are not disadvantaged "from the children's viewpoint."'
Dr. Bartholet rejects the first option allowing a "significant preference"
for racial matching in child placement.' 3 3 This is the position espoused in
the current Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services guidelines.' 34 Professor Bartholet rejects this position as one that causes delay or
otherwise harms the child's best interests, and, therefore, directly violates

racial adoption); Larry I. Palmer, Adoption: A Plea for Realistic ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 8 (1979) (criticizing Drummond decision and stating
that because of placement system, child spent entire life in "legal limbo"); Twila L. Perry,
Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L.
51, 75 (1990) (noting that absence of clear rules governing use of race in placement proceed-

ings resulted in continuing disruption of child's life in McLaughlin case as child was moved
several times between families that were competing for him). The author contends that "the
child had to suffer actual injury before needs other than his racial ones could be judicially
recognized." Id.
127. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1248 (1991).
128. See id. at 1249-52 (listing factors that favor mild preference for same-race placement, and then listing dangers of this approach).
129. See id. at 1253-54 (explaining reasons why no racial preference is best approach).

130. Id. at 1254.
131. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politicsof Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1254-55 (1991).

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See

TEXAS DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE & REGULATORY SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICES HANDBOOK § 6925 (1990) (stating that Department "prefers" racially or ethnically
matched placements and requiring written documentation if placement does not conform to
this consideration).
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anti-discrimination laws. 135
Professor Bartholet next examines a "mild preference" option for race
matching, which would allow racial considerations if all other aspects of the
prospective homes for the child are equal. 136 Although she finds valid arguments favoring this position, Professor Bartholet ultimately rejects it. Factors favoring a mild preference are the possible difficulties that children who
are "different" from the communities might face, and the valid interests of
prospective African-American adoptive parents and the African-American
37
community at large in maintaining the children within their racial group.
However, Professor Bartholet sees the dangers of a mild preference outweighing the perceived benefits. On a symbolic level, any resort to a racematching policy means that the state and social agencies assume the responsibility of deciding what "the appropriate racial composition of families" is,
rather than the families themselves.138 The state should not actively discourage the creation of interracial families, because such units may reinforce
a "positive good" of racial and cultural understanding. 39 Finally, allowing
even a mild preference raises the specter of the state-authorized decisionmaker's placing an inordinate emphasis on the racial factor."
Professor Bartholet concludes that "[t]he generally applicable legal rule
that race should not be allowed to play any role in social decisionmaking
should.., apply in the adoption area as well." 4 ' Instead, she envisions that
agencies, although removed from dictating racial policies, should expand
their role to advise and educate prospective parents on the issues involved in
42
transracial adoption.
VI.

CRITIQUE OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO TEXAS
ADOPTION STANDARDS

A.

Proposed Legislation and Administrative Guidelines Are Inadequate

Texas's higher courts have not defined the state's position on how much, 43
if
any, emphasis can be placed permissibly on race matching in adoption.'
135. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1248-49 (1991) (examining possible outcomes

of significant preference for race matching).
136. See id. at 1259-62 (discussing arguments for and against mild preference for racial
matching).
137. Id. at 1249-51.
138. Id. at 1251.
139. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1252 (1991) (criticizing possible outcome of
mild preference for race matching).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1252.
142. Id. at 1253.
143. See In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1967,
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As the foregoing survey of nationwide trends in legislative action, judicial
decisions, and legal commentary suggests, any solution to this highly
charged issue that permits race to be a factor in the best interests test produces inconsistent results in cases with similar facts.' 4" Despite the United
States Supreme Court's rare foray into the arena of family law to prohibit
the use of race as the sole factor to determine child custody,145 the Court
declined to define the relationship between the best interests test and race,
thus leaving the question open to interpretation and failing to provide definitive guidance to lower courts faced with this issue. 146

no writ) (declaring Texas statute forbidding interracial adoption unconstitutional). The
Gomez court did not address the issue of whether any consideration of race is appropriate in
adoption proceedings but relied almost solely on constitutional precedents involving racial discrimination. See id. at 658-59 (holding statute forbidding interracial adoption violates both the
constitution of Texas and United States). The Gomez case dealt with an African-American
man who wanted to adopt his Hispanic wife's two illegitimate daughters. Id. at 657. His
challenge to the Texas statute, which forbade the adoption, remains one of the most cited cases
in the literature of transracial adoption.
144. Compare Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) (removing African-American child from Caucasian foster
family who wished to adopt him), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978) with McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (ordering African-American child returned to
Caucasian home from which he had been removed). Compare Ethridge v. Ethridge, 360 So. 2d
1005, 1008 (Ala. App. 1978) (removing children from mother's custody following marriage to
African-American man) with In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 129-30 (Pa. Super. 1982)
(returning children to mother after children had been removed because mother had AfricanAmerican boyfriend). See generally Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 59 & n.29 (1990) (noting that
substantial level of discretion allowed by best interests test is unwise when race a factor, based
on unique social history of discrimination); Angela T. McCormick, Note, TransracialAdoption: A CriticalView of the Courts' Present Standards,28 J. FAM. L. 303, 309-14 (1990) (comparing cases that used race as only one factor with those cases that allowed race to overwhelm
all other factors).
145. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
146. See id. at 432-33 (addressing Florida court's rationale based solely on race). The
Palmore decision makes no reference to any previous cases concerning the role of race in
custody proceedings. Instead, the Court focused on racial discrimination cases such as Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held a state miscegenation statute unconstitutional, and
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), which struck down a Kentucky law that ostensibly
promoted public harmony by forbidding African-Americans from buying homes in Caucasian
neighborhoods. Id. at 432-34. See generally Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The
Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 57-65 & 56 n.17 (1990) (discussing Palmore decision and listing several commentaries that dispute effect of decision);
Marshall H. Silverberg & Lisa A. Jonas, Palmore v. Sidoti: Equal Protection and Child Custody Determinations,18 FAM. L.Q. 335, 352 (1984) (concluding that race not to be considered
in adoption based on Palmore); Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Note, Will Palmore v. Sidoti Preclude
the Use of Race as a Factorin Denying an Adoption?, 24 J. FAM. L. 497, 521 (1985) (concluding that Palmore does not preclude state's use of race in adoption proceedings).
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The proposed legislation 147 currently pending in the Texas House of Representatives suffers from this same fatal indeterminacy that plagues the previously discussed standards and judicial decisions. By simply stating that
"'race may not be considered as a primary factor" 141 in determining the best
interests of the child, the bill's wording implies that race may continue to be
considered at some level in adoptive placements. This approach is merely an
echo of the "relevant but not decisive" standard of In re Minor,4 9 which has
allowed courts to follow freely their own personal beliefs in deciding crossracial placements.' ° Such a discretionary standard would doubtless continue to spawn court battles as state placement agencies would still be left
without a clear legal standard. 5 ' Only a definitive legislative mandate
against any racial consideration in the adoption-placement process will offer
protection against decisions such as Drummond."2 By relying on an indeterminate standard, the Drummond court concluded that the state placement agency's removal of the child Timmy from a stable and loving home
was not an "automatic" use of race and the court transparently ignored the
overwhelming racial motives.' 5 3 The children of Texas awaiting adoption
must not be forced to rely on agency and judicial decisionmaking, which
would allow subjective weighing of race as a factor.
The proposed adoption guidelines of the Texas Department of Protective
and Regulatory Services as presently drafted retain a preference for same147. Tex. H.B. 196, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
148. Id.
149. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
150. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face
ofIndeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1975, at 226, 269 (1975) (stating that
indeterminate standard allows judge to rely on own personal values); Larry I. Palmer, Adoption: A Plea for Realistic ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
10-11 (1979) (decrying use of "substitute judgment doctrine" which allows courts and adoption agencies to make decisions on basis of perceptions of child's best interests, rather than on
perception of what child would wish); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 83 (1990) (criticizing discretionary
system that allows judge to decide placement on basis of personal opinion).
151. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 263 (citing study in
which child-welfare professionals were given case studies and asked to make decision whether
to remove children from home). The results showed agreement in less than half the cases, and
different factors were considered decisive by each person. Id.; see Patricia W. Ballard, Note,
RacialMatching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternativesfor the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L.
333, 372 (1979) (concluding that lack of statutory guidelines results in courts' undue reliance
on agency recommendations, thereby giving agencies "almost unbridled ... discretion, which
assumes the force of law").
152. See Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1207 (utilizing Georgia's legislative guidelines to prohibit transracial adoption).
153. See id. (quoting Georgia Department of Human Resources Adoption Services manual as criterion for adoption placement).
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race placement, although more obliquely stated than in the policy currently
in force.' 54 The proposed policy focuses on maintaining the child's racial or
ethnic background, while allowing "consider[ation]" of transracial placement if the staff determines that the prospective parents can aid the child in
developing ethnic awareness and in coping with any difficulties that may
arise due to racial or ethnic differences. 155 The guidelines do offer a better
approach to solving the present controversy surrounding transracial adoption in Texas because they focus on all of the needs of the child rather than
merely ethnicity.' 56
The proposed guidelines also state that the facts to be considered in placement, such as race or ethnicity, continuation of a foster relationship, religion, or special needs, should not delay the selection of an adoptive home for
the child.157 However, the overall approach of the proposed guidelines still
offers impermissibly wide latitude to agency personnel to focus primarily on
race as the factor that will override all other considerations, with the result
that challenges will continue to plague the system. With this approach the
possibility still exists that agencies will interpret such guidelines as a preference for same-race placement, with the resultant delays and challenges that
plague the present system.158

154. Compare TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE AND REGULATORY SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE HANDBOOK § 6925 (Draft Revision 1993) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal)
(noting consideration of child's racial and ethnic heritage) with TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE HANDBOOK § 6925 (1990) (stating preference for samerace placement).
155. See TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE AND REGULATORY SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICE HANDBOOK § 6925 (Draft Revision 1993) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal) (detailing considerations in adoption placement).
156. Id. The guidelines specifically note that the various factors to be considered will
vary from child to child, with differing weight being given to the factors depending on the
child's needs. Id.
157. Id.; see also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:2-48-03 (1990) (providing for prevention of
delays while also considering child's cultural heritage); JOHN GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 35-36 (1973) (recommending that child placement be
final, unconditional, and without delay, and that waiting period in adoption proceedings be
eliminated).
158. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:2-48-03 (1990). Ohio's administrative policies regulating adoption present a good model of procedures which are designed to prevent delays due
to race-matching attempts, yet which still allow the consideration of the child's cultural heritage. The Code provides:
(A) Each agency shall pursue an adoptive placement for children... and shall not apply
discriminatory practices related to race, color, national origin, handicap or age.
(B) No agency shall deny an adoptive placement based solely on race, color, national
origin, handicap or age.
(C) Prospective adoptive parents shall not be denied the opportunity to adopt based on
their race, color, national origin, handicap or age.
(D) The adoptive placement for every child including biracial and multiracial shall meet
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B. Application of FourteenthAmendment Principles to Adoption in Texas
To assure that the Texas adoption laws truly function in the interests of
the children, the statutes should conform to the strict legal principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that guides state-related actions,1 59 and
should eliminate any semblance of governmentally imposed discrimination
based on race."' The Supreme Court has affirmed many times its strong
support for the exercise of individual rights within the context of the family
and intimate-personal associations by grounding these important liberty interests in the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the Court has declared
marriage a fundamental right, 6 ' upheld the right of married couples to use

the child's best interests and address the special needs of the child. Cultural heritage may
be a factor for consideration provided that the adoptive family can meet the special needs
of the child. However, the sole criterion in the selection or denial of an adoptive placement shall not be race or cultural heritage.
(E) Child-specific recruitment activities shall be conducted . . . to locate an adoptive
placement of the same cultural heritage provided the adoptive placement . . . is not
delayed because of failure by the agency to locate an adoptive placement of the same
cultural heritage.
(H) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to permit the agency to unduly extend the
child's stay in substitute care until a same cultural heritage adoptive placement is
recruited.
Id.
159. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (declaring that action of state courts
and judicial officers is state action and therefore governed by 14th Amendment); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879) (holding that no state agency or its officials can deny
citizens equal protection).
160. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (stating that primary purpose of
14th Amendment is to eliminate all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (alluding to constitutional principle that race should be irrelevant in governmental actions); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating that racial classifications are directly subversive to principles of
equality found in 14th Amendment); In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. App. 1991)
(affirming that 14th Amendment's purpose is to do away with racial discrimination). See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics ofRace Matching in
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1226 (1991) (stating that race matching violates United
States laws on discrimination); Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a
Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 341 (1968) (stating that if
race sole factor for differentiation and other factors mostly ignored, then such governmental
guidelines may be unconstitutional); Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 722-23 n.36 (1950) (suggesting that statutes that
merely suggest race as determination in adoption may be founded on an unconstitutional
criterion).
161. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (striking down state statute that
forbade marriage of person who owed unpaid child support); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (characterizing marriage as fundamental right); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 211 (1888) (declaring marriage as foundation of family and society).
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contraceptives, 162 struck down a state statute prohibiting interracial mar64
riage,' 63 invalidated a state statute forbidding interracial cohabitation,'
and declared that race could not be used as a justification for modification of
child custody.' 65 All of these decisions lead inexorably to the conclusion
that the state must take care not to engage inappropriately in the ordering of
private lives, especially through invidious race-conscious actions. To withstand rigorous scrutiny, even benign racial classifications intended to benefit
minorities must be narrowly tailored to achieve the desired benefit.' 66 The
fact that legally sanctioned race matching tends to delay placement of minority children into permanent homes is certainly more harmful than beneficial. Therefore, a legislative mandate that forbids any consideration of race
as a factor in adoption proceedings will best serve the interests of children
seeking a permanent home.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Texas must reform its child-adoption laws at both the statutory and administrative levels to eliminate any consideration of race as a factor in adoption. This action will remove the decisions, which shape the lives of the
state's most helpless citizens, from the realms of conjecture and unwarranted

assumptions driven by deeply ingrained societal and personal biases.'

67

Em-

162. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
163. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.

164. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
165. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 (1984).
166. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that racial
classifications carry danger of stigmatizing harm); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 273 (1986) (noting rigorous scrutiny necessary for racial classification, even if operating
against group not traditionally subjected to discrimination); cf Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that antidiscrimination
measures benefit protected group by conferring benefits or by shielding actions taken to rectify
past discrimination). Commentators have contrasted race-matching policies with affirmative
action programs and have concluded that there are several significant differences that make the
two policies inapposite. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black ChildrenBelong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1231-37 (1991) (comparing antidiscrimination policies, such as affirmative action, with race matching policies). For example,
traditional affirmative-action programs must (1) be narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination, (2) be limited in duration, (3) must promote racial integration, and (4) benefit racial
minorities. Id. In contrast, race matching is forward looking, is not limited in time, is
designed to perpetuate racial separatism, and is detrimental to minority children who are denied a home. Id. See generally Martha Minow, The FreeExercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REV. 925, 939 (1991) (advocating that free-exercise analysis, similar to Supreme Court's analysis in religion cases, be implemented for family matters, including scrutiny of state race-matching policies).
167. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 58 (1991) (discussing use of race in Palmore). Professor Gotanda notes that the
Supreme Court's Palmore decision focused solely on the possible bias and prejudices that
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pirical studies show that transracially adopted children fare no worse than
other children in accomplishment and life adjustment; conversely, there is
abundant evidence indicating that children who experience significant delays
in finding a permanent home, who drift from foster placement to foster
placement, or who languish in institutions, do experience significant psychological trauma, which may impair them for a lifetime. 16' The increasing
crises in modem society, such as AIDS, poverty, and teen pregnancy, weigh
disproportionately on minorities, resulting in large numbers of minority children entering the social-services system.' 69 For those who are seeking permanent homes, the factor society should weigh most heavily when matching
the child to the family should be: "Can this home give this child a safe and
loving environment?"
For Christopher Jenkins, a Texas district court answered "yes" by granting his Caucasian foster parents the right to adopt him.' 70 But for other
children, such as Timmy in the Drummond case, the answer may depend
solely on the disparity of race or ethnicity between the children and the families wanting to adopt them.
Justice Powell alluded to "the principle that the Constitution envisions a
nation where race is irrelevant,"'' and stated that "[t]he time cannot come
too soon when no governmental decision will be based upon immutable
characteristics or pigmentation."'' 72 Until that time, a child's best interests
will be truly protected in adoption placement only by adhering to the antidiscrimination principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.

might affect a child growing up in a biracial home, and never even considered that growing up
in a home with two cultures might be of positive value to the child. Id.
168. See Patricia W. Ballard, Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternatives for the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 356-57 (1979) (stating child is harmed by
delay in placement in permanent home).
169. See AIDS, FACTS AND ISSUES 253 (Victor Gong & Norman Rudnick eds., 1987)
(noting that AIDS affects African-Americans disproportionately). African-Americans comprise approximately 12.5% of the United States population, and 25% of reported AIDS cases.
African-American children represent approximately 56% of all pediatric AIDS cases. Id.; see
also RICHARD H.

ROPERS, PERSISTENT POVERTY:

THE AMERICAN

DREAM TURNED

NIGHTMARE 183 (1991) (citing unemployment rate of approximately 45% for African-American male adults, and concluding that high rates of unemployment and underemployment of
African-American men greatly influence instability in families. See generally RITA J. SIMON &
HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 121-26 (1987) (discuss-

ing different lifestyle choices of Caucasian and non-Caucasian population); Twila L. Perry,
Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L.
51, 51 (1990) (noting gaps in infant mortality, unemployment levels, and AIDS cases in African-American and Caucasian population).
170. In re Christopher Dewayne Hardin, Nos. 1067-CX & 2828-CX (Dist. Ct. of Taylor
County, 326th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Feb. 26, 1993).
171. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 516 (Powell, J. concurring).
172. Id.
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